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THE ONTOGENESIS OF THE HUMAN
PERSON: A NEO-ARISTOTELIAN VIEW
MATHEW Lu
It has now become something of a commonplace among pro-life writers
to claim that the question of when human life begins is settled by empirical
science. While there is a sense in which this is true, in a broader sense the
claim is not quite accurate. Properly speaking, this question belongs not to
the empirical sciences, but to ontology. Therefore, a serious answer to the
question-while it will certainly have to incorporate the findings of empirical
embryology-must come from the branch of speculative philosophy that
Christopher Tollefsen has labeled "philosophical embryology."'
In what follows, I examine the question of when human life begins from
a neo-Aristotelian perspective. In my view, the basic principles of Aristotle's
metaphysics inform an account of human life (and the human person) that
offers the best explanation of the available phenomena. This account-the
substance account of the human person--can fully incorporate the
contemporary findings of empirical embryology, while also recognizing the
essential uniqueness of rational human nature.
We need an accurate answer to the question of when human life beings
to inform our practical reasoning about the ethics of abortion and the
treatment of human embryos. However, it is important to recognize that those
practical considerations follow from the speculative conclusions and not vice
versa. We should not begin from any practical position-including a pro-life
position-and attempt to reason back to a theoretical account of the embryo
to vindicate that position. Instead, I think we will discover that the best
available metaphysics results in a view of the human person that naturally
leads to the pro-life conclusion.
While my ultimate goal is to provide the most compelling contemporary
account of philosophical embryology, it will be useful to consider the
historical question of how Aristotle (and his followers, such as St. Thomas)
viewed the embryo in order to forestall certain common misconceptions. This
defective historical view was the result of combining some of the key
1. Christopher Tollefsen, Some Questions for Philosophical Embryology, 85 AM. CATH.
PHIL. QUART. 447 (2011).
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principles of Aristotle's metaphysics with a number of now untenable
empirical beliefs. While those empirical beliefs should be rejected, the
metaphysical principles are severable from them and remain fundamentally
viable.' Accordingly, I will attempt to articulate a neo-Aristotelian account
of the ontogenesis of human life that synthesizes the empirical findings of
contemporary embryology with the best available metaphysical principles to
show that every human embryo is a full human person from the beginning of
its existence as an organism. I will conclude by briefly showing how this neo-
Aristotelian view sidesteps some of the most common pro-abortion
objections against the full humanity of the embryo.
THE HISTORICAL VIEW
It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle held that early abortion is
permissible simply because he thought early embryos are not fully human. In
a very brief passage in Book VII of the Politics, he offers just about his only
normative remarks concerning abortion:
As for the exposure and nurture of infants, let there be a law against
nourishing those that are deformed, but if exposing offspring because
the number of children one has is prohibited by the customary rule,
then a numerical limit must be set upon procreation. But if children
are conceived by some of those who have intercourse in violation of
this, an abortion must be induced before the onset of sensation and
life. For what is holy will be distinguished from what is not by means
of sensation and life.3
This has led some contemporary commentators to make claims to the
effect that "if Aristotle had known what we now know about embryology he
would have been opposed to abortion altogether."4 In general, it seems that
such commentators read the passage to say that abortion is "holy" until the
"onset of sensation and life" (a point that other Aristotelian sources place
forty or ninety days post conception), but not afterwards. However, this line
2. It must be admitted that this neo-Aristotelian metaphysical outlook is very much a
minority view within contemporary philosophy, but of course as in so many things popularity is not
synonymous with truth. Nonetheless, this viewpoint does continue to find important defenders
including figures such as John Haldane, David Oderberg, Edward Feser and others. Obviously in
this context, I cannot attempt to defend Aristotle's metaphysics as a whole. However, others have
provided able defenses of many of these fundamental principles against modem critics. See, for
instance, DAVID S. ODERBERG, REAL ESSENTIALISM (2008).
3. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: BOOKS VII AND ViHI 1335bl 9-26 (Richard Kraut trans., Clarendon
Press 1997).
4. PETER L. PHILLIPS SIMPSON, A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY ON THE POLITICS OF
ARISTOTLE 247 (1998).
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of thinking goes, on the basis of contemporary embryology we can now
confidently push the onset point well back (perhaps all the way to
conception), so we should conclude that today Aristotle would be opposed to
nearly all forms of abortion.
Unfortunately for the pro-life commentators, and as I have explained at
length elsewhere,' this represents a misreading of the passage in general and
his use of the word hosios ("holy") specifically. What Aristotle is actually
saying is not that early abortion is permissible (i.e. "holy"), while later
abortion is illicit (i.e. "unholy"). Instead, he is marking out the kind of
wrongness that is involved in abortion in a very certain context (namely, the
violation of a relatively rare religious norm against infanticide that was then
current in a very few Greek city-states, among them Thebes and Ephesus).
This is clear from the fact that the entire distinction is relevant only in those
places where the exposure of excess children is "prohibited by the customary
rule."
For his part, Aristotle does not give any reason to believe that he is
opposed to infanticide. Rather, in this passage he is simply accommodating
the contingent, historical fact that a few Greek cities happened to have
"customary rules" against exposure/infanticide, and so in those places (and
presumably only those places) abortion should be procured early so as to
avoid violating the religious principle that human children should not be
killed. According to his embryology, the "onset of life and sensation" marks
out the point before which one can reliably say that a human being does not
exist. In fact, this passage from Politics VII offers no real argument on the
moral question at all. It merely offers a practical Aristotelian answer to the
question: if the killing of a young human being is prohibited (for religious
reasons), when (in the course of pregnancy) can abortion be procured so not
to involve the killing of a young human being?
In short, this passage from the Politics gives little ammunition to the pro-
life side precisely because Aristotle calmly seems to accept the customary
Greek practice of exposure/infanticide. Given that he does not rule out
infanticide, it should come as no surprise that he offers no free-standing
normative principle for ruling out abortion.6 Thus, Aristotle does not hold
that early abortion is permissible simply because early embryos are not full
human beings; rather, he seems to accept the general permissibility of
abortion and infanticide in their own right, though he is willing to permit
local custom to prohibit them for religious reasons.
At this point, I think we have to conclude that Aristotle himself is not a
helpful guide to the specific question of the normative status of abortion.
5. Mathew Lu, Aristotle on Abortion and Infanticide, 53 INT. PHIL. QUART. 47 (2013).
6. Another way of the putting the point is that he seems to be a legal positivist on this
question, content to follow the local laws and customs whatever they may be.
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Though there certainly are modem commentators who argue for the
permissibility of infanticide, this fortunately remains beyond the pale in most
contemporary communities.' Accordingly, Aristotle's specific conclusions
from the Politics are unhelpful in the present context.
On the other hand, later thinkers do have normative resources that
Aristotle lacked, which lead them to reject both infanticide and abortion.
Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas are representative of the later tradition,'
in that they both hold the direct impermissibility of abortion.' At the same
time, however, they generally follow both Aristotle's theoretical embryology
and empirical beliefs. So the later tradition offers a more promising direction
for finding moral arguments about abortion.
For the later tradition, a significant part of the abortion issue revolves
around the question of whether (or when) abortion constitutes homicide. The
general view was simply that early abortion (before the "onset of life and
sensation") does not constitute homicide, precisely because the early embryo
is not a homo. It is important to note, however, that there are other evils
besides murder, and both Augustine and Thomas would have regarded even
early abortion as morally abhorrent for reasons other than its being an
instance of murder. Nonetheless, it is true that they held that early abortion
did not involve the killing of a human being. To understand why, we have to
go to Aristotle's philosophical biology.o
These medieval figures held a "delayed hominization" view of (human)
embryology derived from Aristotle. On this view, the embryo goes through
a hierarchically ordered series of ontologically distinct stages, only the last
of which is fully human. Essentially, the embryo begins as the lowest kind of
living creature-possessed of a merely "vegetative" nature-before being
substantially transformed into an ontologically higher creature-possessed
of an "animal" nature-and only some time later being substantially
transformed again into another yet ontologically higher creature-a rational
human being. This succession of ontological transformations within the
7. This is apparent in the media reaction to the publication of After-birth Abortion: Why
Should the Baby Live? Of course, there was nothing really new in the proposal for "after-birth
abortion" as figures like Michael Tooley and Peter Singer have been advancing similar arguments
in favor of infanticide for decades. Alberto Giubilini & Francesca Minerva, After-birth Abortion:
Why Should the Baby Live? 39 JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS 261 (2012).
8. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Abortion and the Catholic Church: A Summary History, 12
NATURAL LAW FORUM 85 (1967)
9. Practically speaking, the Christian thinkers are in a similar position as those Greek
communities (e.g. Thebes and Ephesus), which did have "customary rules" against exposure.
Theoretically speaking, however, the Christian thinkers had the advantage of a system of moral
thought that allows for principled rejection of child murder (e.g. the Natural Law), which the Greeks
did not. We can see the difficulty just by reflecting on how, exactly, one should explain the
wrongness of murder (of any sort) on strictly Aristotelian grounds.
10. 1 give more details on Aristotle's philosophical embryology in "Embryology: Medieval
and Modem," HUMAN LIFE REVIEW 40 (2014). See the notes there for further references.
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individual human embryo reflects Aristotle's broader conception of animate
nature more generally, which he divides into the same basic three categories:
vegetative, animal, and rational.
Among living things, the vegetative powers, which include nutrition,
metabolism, growth, self-repair, and reproduction, are the ontologically
lowest, precisely because they are the minimum necessary for life.
Accordingly, these vegetative powers belong to the natures of all livings
things. Ontologically higher creatures add other powers to these vegetative
ones, including the characteristic "animal" powers of sensation and
movement." Indeed, the exact sense in which animals are ontologically
higher than plants (and other very simple creatures)12 is that all of the sorts of
vital processes at work within plants are also at work within animals, though
not vice versa, as animals alone possess powers related to basic cognition and
locomotion. Human beings are essentially rational animals, which means that
qua animals they possess all the aforementioned vegetative and animal
powers but qua rational human nature includes the ontologically highest
powers involving reason.
While the lower vegetative and animal powers are essentially embodied
organic powers, the same is not true of the rational powers. The rational
powers are fundamentally immaterial, simply because true knowledge is the
knowledge of universals, which no particular material thing is capable of
encompassing. This contrasts with sense perception or feelings like anger that
are locatable in specific organs. Accordingly, for Aristotle, there can be no
organ of rational thought. This is not to deny that in normal cases human
thought is dependent on a functioning brain, but thought cannot be in the
brain the way sense perception is in the sense organs."
As noted above, this tripartite division of animate nature is reflected in
the development of a specific individual embryo. Aristotle's grounds for
holding this successionist view are clearly empirical. In the History of
Animals, Aristotle writes:
In the case of male children the first movement usually occurs on the
right-hand side of the womb and about the fortieth day, but if the
i1. We have some difficulty in terminology because the etymological root of the English word
animal is the Greek anima, which means, philosophically, soul-form. So, for Aristotle, not just
animals, but all living things-plants, animals, human beings (what I have been calling "animate
nature")--are animated. What distinguishes material living things from inanimate nature is that
living things are partitually constituted by a soul-form that exercises the vegetative powers.
12. Very simple organisms such as bacteria or amoebas, would actually count as "plants" on
this Aristotelian schema.
13. This means, among other things, that Aristotle's schema can easily accommodate non-
human rational beings, should any exist. Because the rational powers are not, as such, necessarily
connected to the organic powers, rationality is (in principle, at least) severable from animality. See
ODERBERG, supra note 2.
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child be a female then on the left-hand side and about the ninetieth
day.... About this period the embryo begins to resolve into distinct
parts, it having hitherto consisted of a flesh-like substance without
distinction of parts.
In the case of a male embryo aborted at the fortieth day, if it be
placed in cold water it holds together in a sort of membrane, but if it
be placed in any other fluid it dissolves and disappears. If the
membrane be pulled to bits the embryo is revealed, as big as one of
the large kind of ants; and all the limbs are plain to see, including the
penis, and the eyes also, which as in other animals are of great size.
But the female embryo, if it suffers abortion during the first three
months, is as a rule found to be undifferentiated; if however it reaches
the fourth month it comes to be subdivided and quickly attains
further differentiation.14
This passage is significant because it gives us a good idea of how Aristotle
thinks we can empirically identify the physical changes in the embryo that
correspond to the first two ontological stages of the delayed hominization
theory.' 5 Note that the initial vegetative stage is characterized by "a flesh-like
substance without distinction of parts."l6 This is important because the
"parts" he has in mind are organs (as his examples make clear). It is precisely
because the embryo is undifferentiated before forty or ninety days that it
cannot possess an animal soul, because animal souls necessarily inform
organs.
The reason for this is found in the Generation ofAnimals where he writes,
"those principles whose activity is bodily cannot exist without a body, e.g.
walking cannot exist without feet"" This follows directly from his
hylomorphism, insofar as he considers all individual organisms to be
composites of form (soul) and matter. In the absence of physical organs, the
characteristic powers of the animal soul-form (sensation and locomotion)
would have nothing to animate and so could not exist. Because the early
embryo is undifferentiated and lacks organs it simply cannot possess an
animal nature. Therefore, insofar as it is a living thing he thinks it must be
14. ARISTOTLE, History of Animals, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED
OXFORD TRANSLATION 583b3-26 (Jonathan Barnes ed., A.W. Thompson trans., Princeton
University Press 1984).
15. Almost all of these empirical observations are inaccurate, of course. Fetal movement is
only detectable (by the mother) much later than Aristotle suggests, and a distinction of parts is
present in the embryo from conception (because a distinction of parts is present in all cells).
16. ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 583b3-26.
17. ARISTOTLE, Generation of Animals, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE
REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 736b24 (Jonathan Barnes ed., A. Platt trans., Princeton University
Press 1984).
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merely vegetative.
On the other hand, once it develops parts (i.e. organs), then an
ontologically higher animal soul informs the matter of the embryo. It is
important to note that this ontological change requires a cause external to the
embryo itself, because it involves an increase in reality. That is to say,
because an animal soul is ontologically higher than a vegetative soul, then
the vegetative soul itself cannot be the cause of that change. Basically, this
reflects the fundamental Aristotelian (and common-sense) metaphysical
principle that something cannot give what it does not have.' An ontologically
lower thing cannot be the cause of a change into something ontologically
higher than itself. So some external cause must bring about the change, and
that is in fact Aristotle's view. He holds that the father's soul is not only the
formal and efficient cause of the embryo's initial vegetative existence at
conception, but also that the father's soul is the cause of the embryo's
ontological transformation from a vegetative creature into an animal. He
thinks this occurs through the imparting of a "vital heat" to the mother's
"catamenia" that actually persists within her forty or ninety days after
conception.
The father's soul, however, is not the cause of the ontological change
from an animal into a rational being. As noted above, no material instrument
could possibly bring about this change because reason is entirely immaterial.
Instead, Aristotle merely cryptically remarks that reason is "divine" and that
the cause of this transformation comes from "outside." 9 Further, because
reason lacks an organ, there is no physical marker of the last ontological
changes. This is why the Politics passage counsels abortion before the
embryo's transformation into an animal as a kind of cautionary principle: if
you destroy the embryo before it is even an animal, then you can be assured
that you have not killed a human being.
While there are many further details I have not discussed, but for our
purposes this should suffice to understand why I claim that Aristotle holds
the successionist view on empirical grounds. He bases his theory of the three
hierarchically ordered, and ontologically distinct stages on the presence or
absence of specific empirical signs, specifically the differentiation of
parts/organs. The absence of organs is a completely reliable sign that no
animal soul is present because an animal soul can only be present insofar as
it informs matter organized into organs.
Precisely because the successionist view depends on these false empirical
views, it is no longer tenable. Instead, the contemporary evidence confirms
the presence of parts-and, in Aristotelian terms, "organs"-on an
18. In the Thomistic tradition this is often referred to as the "principle of proportionate
causality." See EDWARD FESER, AQUINAS (A BEGINNER'S GUIDE) 22-3 (2009).
19. ARISTOTLE, supra note 17, at 736b26ff.
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intracellular level even in the zygote. Further, contemporary empirical
science also reveals the fundamental continuity of embryonic development.
This means there are no plausible ontological inflection points, marked by
physical changes, such as the supposed initial presence of parts at forty or
ninety days. Without any such ontological inflection points, the successionist
view is impossible. Of course there is no way Aristotle himself could have
known about any of this new empirical evidence, but had he known, he surely
would have reconsidered his overall embryological theory. That said, the new
evidence does not significantly impact his overall metaphysical picture. If we
have other good reasons to retain it (e.g. because it remains the most
conceptually satisfying and explanatorily powerful ontology), then the proper
philosophical embryology should seek to synthesize those metaphysical
principles with the contemporary science.
ARISTOTELIAN ONTOLOGY AND THE CONTEMPORARY EVIDENCE
Now that we have a very basic picture of the way in which empirical
observations informed the traditional delayed hominization embryology, I
want to turn to the question of how we might construct a neo-Aristotelian
account in light of the contemporary empirical evidence. We will begin by
attempting to ascertain the diachronic identity conditions for a human
being-i.e., the conditions that allows us to say that the same human being
persists through time. The most natural approach is to work back towards the
beginning by asking: what determines the identity of the self-same human
being across any temporally extended period? So, for instance, what makes
it the case that I am the same thing that I was one year ago, or five, or fifteen?
Why am I the same human being as the child born now almost forty years
ago? It seems obvious that I am he and he is I, and yet some of the most
obvious possible grounds for explaining that identity are almost immediate
non-starters.
For instance, the chemical constituents of my body are in a constant state
of flux. At the cellular level, the vast majority (though not all) of my cells
have been replaced many times over since my birth. From a broader
perspective, the overall morphology of my body has changed dramatically
over the years.
From a psychological standpoint, things are much the same. My earliest
memories only go back to around four years of age. My beliefs and desires
have changed greatly over the course of my life, and many of them are also
in a state of flux. My cognitive processes and capacities have changed greatly
as I achieved the use of language and progressively manifested various other
rational powers. Indeed, for quite some time after my birth I manifested no
apparent rational powers.
Yet for all of this, I have remained the same individual across all of these
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manifold physical and psychological changes. The question remains: what
grounds the identity of the human being that persisted across all of these
many changes? If the purely material and purely psychological options prove
unavailing, the most natural recourse is to make my identity a function of
being the self-same living thing. What seems most obviously to persist
though all the material and psychological changes is the same living
organism. Yet, if we go in this direction, a new difficulty arises: precisely
how should we understand a living thing as alive?
The problem of how to define life is extremely difficult. As Michael
Thompson has shown, the standard biology textbook definitions are generally
unsuccessful insofar as they attempt to offer any kind of reductive
explanation of life.20 Life itself seems to be a basic category of reality,
incapable of being further reduced to any simpler reality.
Once we have recognized that life itself is (in some deep sense) a basic
feature of reality, we can still ask: what sort of properties mark it out? For an
Aristotelian, this is where the powerful idea of immanent causation comes
into play. As David Oderberg explains, the powers that are essential to (and
definitive of) life are best understood in terms of what "begins with the agent
and terminates in the agent for the sake of the agent."2' A living thing
exercises immanent causation precisely insofar as its internal activity is
ordered towards its own good as such. Because only living things can possess
a good, per se, outside of animate nature there is only transient causation, that
"is the causation of one thing or event (or state, process, etc.) by another
where the effect terminates in the former."2 2 Of course, the biological activity
of living beings involves many instances of transient causation.23 However,
within a living creature, all of its transient causal processes serve a higher
end: the end (telos) which constitutes its good. So living things, and only
living things, are characterized by sets of causal processes that together serve
the good of the individual organism.
It is only because individual biological organisms possess a good, and
thus that things can go well or badly for them,24 that it makes sense to think
of an individual organism as the subject of a life. What unifies an individual
organisms' temporally extended physical (and, in some cases, psychological)
processes is the fact that they jointly serve (or, fail to serve) the normative
end of a living a good life for the kind of thing it is. That normative end itself
is determined by the nature of that organism as a member of a natural kind,
20. See MICHAEL THOMPSON, Can Life Be Given a Real Definition?, Chapter 2 in LIFE AND
ACTION: ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF PRACTICE AND PRACTICAL THOUGHT 33-48 (2008).
21. ODERBERG, supra note 2, at 180.
22. Id.
23. Id. (providing examples of transient causation range from intracellular biochemical
activity to larger scale activities such as eating).
24. DAVID S. ODERBERG, MORAL THEORY: A NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH (2000).
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which determines the physical (and, in some cases, psychological) conditions
for its flourishing (the absence of which lead to its failing as a organism of
that kind). This, of course, includes human beings, which possess a nature
just as much not of their own choosing as any other living thing.
With all of this in mind, we can now return to the original question: when
does human life begin? We will be able to answer this question if we can
determine at what point in the normal course of human generation there exists
an ontologically unique biological organism with a human nature. At first,
this might seem to be simply a question for empirical science. However,
unless we beg the question of what an organism is, a full answer requires a
philosophical judgment informed by the empirical findings. This is because,
given the observations above about the non-reductive character of life, what
counts as an organism is itself a philosophically loaded question.
In the Aristotelian context already introduced, the question can be re-
articulated in terms of immanent causation. When in the course of human
development does a proper subject of continuous immanent causation exist?25
At this point, understanding empirical embryology is essential.
We can begin by working our way backwards from a paradigmatic adult
human being, and we encounter no serious problems in recognizing the
metaphysical identity of the self-same organism though the conventional
stages of adolescence, childhood, and infancy. The enormous changes across
even these conventional stages pose no great difficulties because, on this neo-
Aristotelian model, what underwrites the relevant continuity is neither strictly
material nor psychological. But, of course, the same is true into the prenatal
stages as well. Birth involves no intrinsic change in the child, though
obviously there are significant extrinsic changes. The fetus is unambiguously
the subject of the same kinds of immanent causal processes throughout its
growth and development in utero that the child is after birth. In fact, the
contemporary evidence suggests no plausible break in the continuity of
immanent causation of the self-same organism at any point after the
development of the primitive streak at approximately fourteen days post
conception.
It is at this point that we arrive at our first real potential marker for
substantial change, what is sometimes called the twinning point. For reasons
that are apparently not well understood, human embryos prior to this point
are liable to undergo monozygotic twinning, whereby a single "parent"
embryo divides into two genetically identical "daughter" embryos. This can
occur as early as the two celled stage, but generally occurs between days five
and nine, and must occur before the development of the primitive streak at
25. By "subject" I mean both the linguistic subject of subject-predicate propositions
expressing immanent causal activity in Thompson's sense, and also the ontological subject/agent of
that activity in the sense of the "for the sake of' in Oderberg's definition of immanent causation.
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approximately day fourteen.26 Various commenters have suggested that the
mere possibility of twinning poses a problem for claiming that the pre-
fourteen day embryo is a "human individual."
The supposed problem is expressed by Norman Ford:
It would ... be more coherent to hold that whilst admitting the zygote
is a living individual being, it could not be a human individual on the
simple grounds that, given the right conditions, it had the natural
active potentiality to develop into an adult. It could, given the right
conditions, equally develop into two adult human individuals. It
would have to be both one, and more than one, human individual at
the same time. This would be absurd. It is necessary, in practice, to
abandon this theoretical attempt to show that the potential for
identical twinning in human zygotes is compatible with their
personal status based on their natural active capacity to develop into
adult persons. The conclusion again would seem to be that a human
individual could not be present at the completion of fertilization. The
human individual would have to begin at some later stage in the
development of the multiplying blastomeres.27
His central point is that because the early embryo (he specifies zygote,
but twinning can occur through the blastocyst stage) has the potential to
become two human individuals, then neither of the "daughter" individuals
can be ontologically identified with "parent" embryo. Therefore, on this
account, the ontological continuity of human development can only be said
to begin after the possibility of twinning is past and no "human individual"
is present before that point.
This argument has always struck me as rather strange. Why should it be
true that just because there is some possibility that an individual substance
can be split that there can be no ontological continuity in the case in which it
does not actually split? If I have a banana, it is possible to make a banana
split. However, it is surely strange to claim that because my banana can
possibly be cut in two, it is not the same banana if it is not actually divided.
It seems to me that the mere possibility that a substance can divide is
insufficient to conclude that there is no diachronic identity when in fact it
does not divide.
26. These empirical details drawn from Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, The First Fourteen
Days of Human Life, THE NEW ATLANTIS (Summer 2006). Maureen Condic has suggested to me
that these details are perhaps not a clearly established as Lee and George seem to think. Ultimately,
it matters little for my overall point.
27. NORMAN M. FORD, WHEN DID I BEGIN?: CONCEPTION OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL IN
HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 122 (1991).
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Alternately, consider the case in which division does occur, for instance,
with an earth worm. If we cut the worm in two at the very center of its length,
someone like Ford might claim that there would be no way to say which of
the two "daughter" worms is ontologically identical with the uncut worm.
There is apparently no non-arbitrary way identify either "daughter" with the
"parent," because each of the "daughters" has the same mass."28 They would
be, as Ford claims, "identical indiscernibles, except for their separate
concrete existences."29
Suppose this is correct and the daughter worms really are "identical
indiscernibles." This would imply that we would have no material grounds
for identifying either "daughter" with the "parent." It would not, however,
give us any specific reason for doubting that the original worm was, in fact,
a worm. It seems that there are two possibilities here: (1) the original worm
continues to exist as a materially smaller worm, while the second (genetically
identical) "daughter" worm is an ontologically new organism/substance, or
(2) the original worm goes out of existence at the time of the division (i.e.
dies) and two subsequent individual worms come into existence, neither of
which is ontologically identical to the original (i.e. there are three total
individuals). Whichever is the correct description, it remains the case that at
least one worm is in existence the entire time.30
Of course there is a distinction between the worm and embryo cases in
that the original worm is a mature instance of its species. However, this is a
distinction without much difference. What is necessary for our purposes is
not to establish that every living adult human being is, in fact, ontologically
identical with some previously existing single celled zygote, or that every
human being comes into existence with fertilization. In the case of identical
twins, it turns out to be the case that at least one (and perhaps both) of the
twins came into existence as a "daughter" of the original zygote. Nonetheless,
even if neither twin is ontologically identical with the "parent" zygote, that
does not entail that the zygote itself is not a "human individual" (i.e. an
ontologically unique substance with a human nature).
28. Id. at 122. Ford explicitly discusses the analogous case: "Since both twins would be
identical in every respect after the division ofthe zygote, it would be impossible to provide adequate
criteria to determine which one was [identical with the original zygote]."
29. Id. It is perhaps worth noting that, for a Thomist, their "separate concrete existences"
would be enough to distinguish them in terms of their individual acts of existence. In principle, the
identity of one of the daughters with the parent might be established if it one of the daughters shared
the same act of existence as the parent. However, this metaphysical truth of the matter might be
epistemologically undiscoverable.
30. In Fission and Confusion, David B. Hershenov and Rose Koch-Hershenov have proposed
a strange theory in which we should think of the original embryo as possessed of two souls, one of
which is inherited by each of the daughters. If this rather outlandish theory were correct it would
imply the right reading of the embryo case is analogous to (1). Ultimately, however, it matters little
to real question of whether the original embryo is a human being. David B. Hershenov & Rose
Koch-Hershenov. Fission and Confusion, CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 12, n.237-54 (2006).
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In cases where twinning does occur, we may have to concede we cannot
establish the humanity of that particular early embryo by demonstrating its
ontological continuity with an adult human being. However, by itself that
does not show that the early embryo is not a human individual, only that some
early embryos are not ontologically identical with a temporally subsequent
adult." Furthermore, the continuity strategy does establish the humanity of
the early embryo stage of the life-cycle of any non-twinned adult. To show
that the early embryo in twinning cases is not a human individual would
require showing it is a different kind of thing altogether than the embryo that
does not twin. However, this is grossly implausible, as it would require one
to argue that early embryos that (contingently) do undergo twinning are not
human individuals, while embryos that (contingently) do not happen to
undergo twinning are human individuals.
Perhaps someone like Ford might seek to take refuge in the difference
between induced twinning (or worm cutting), and what he describes as the
embryo's putative "natural active capacity to develop into" multiple adult
persons. Ultimately, however, this makes little difference. If we consider
creatures that reproduce asexually by binary fission (e.g., bacteria, etc.), the
fact that the "parent" organism has a "natural active capacity" to develop into
multiple "daughters" does not change the fact that the "parent" is an instance
of the same natural kind. The "parent" bacterium is still a bacterium, even if
it undergoes binary fission, and even if it is not clear (epistemically) whether
it is ontologically identical to one of the "daughters."
Furthermore, in the case of human embryos, we simply do not understand
the twinning mechanism, so it is far from clear that the embryo even has a
natural active capacity for twinning. Research in vitro seems to suggest that
twinning can result from external manipulation. It is conceivable that even in
the natural twinning cases, the process is a response to external circumstances
and not the expression of a "natural active capacity." At this point, I think we
have to allow that we simply do not know enough to make a judgment.
There is another empirical consideration closely related to the twinning
issue that also bears consideration. It is sometimes claimed that the
blastomeres constituting the early embryo (before cavitation and the
development of the inner cell mass) are totipotent. Some empirical evidence
seems to show that at least some blastomeres, in the right circumstances, are
capable of developing into an independent, genetically identical twin, if
separated from the other blastomeres (and placed in the right environment).
Certain studies suggest that it might be possible to initiate twinning by
31. But of course many embryos do not survive (e.g. spontaneous miscarriage), and therefore
are not ontologically identical with a temporally subsequent adult. But that, by itself, does not
suffice to show that they are not human individuals, any more than the fact that some children fail
to reach adulthood suffices to show that those children are not human individuals.
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external manipulation of early embryos in vitro.32
As with the natural twinning case considered above, the mere possibility
that totipotent cells might become separate human individuals is taken as a
reason for denying that the early embryo is a human individual. My earlier
remarks concerning natural twinning are fully applicable here as well. There
mere fact that it is possible for a misguided researcher to remove a blastomere
from an early embryo, and have an ontologically separate embryo develop
from it, does not by itself show that the original embryo was not a human
individual. This is even less of a problem than the halving of the worm,
because in this case there would be good reason to claim the ontological
continuity of the early embryo with the "donor" blastocyst."
Totipotency raises yet another potentially troubling issue concerning the
early embryo for some commentators. They argue that the blastomeres that
make up the early embryo do not constitute an organic unity and therefore
that the blastocyst is a not a single living biological organism.34 For instance,
David Hershenov and Rose Koch-Hershenov offer as the "biological basis
for [their] claim that the early embryo taken as a whole is not alive [the claim]
that the cells of the embryo don't cooperate for the benefit of the whole in
the way that is typical of a multicell organism."" Instead, they claim the early
embryo is merely a composite of multiple independent living organisms
analogous to the way "the cheerleader organisms composing [a cheerleader]
pyramid can be in contact, communicate, and coordinate themselves without
composing a giant organism. "36
If the early embryo is not a single organism, then it could not be a human
individual. As we saw, the basis for this rather strange judgment is the
empirical claim that the blastomeres do not "cooperate" in the ways that the
cells of a proper multicellular organism do, specifically by functioning "as a
unit, maintaining homeostasis, metabolizing food, excreting waste,
32. See the discussion of these studies in Rose Koch-Hershenov, Totipotency, Twinning, and
Ensoulment at Fertilization, 31 J. MED. PHILOS. 139-64 (2006) (arguing, "that current biological
data on the human embryo does not provide sufficient evidence for the totipotency of human
embryonic cells" Id. at 143.). Ultimately, this is an empirical question, not a philosophical one, and
best left to the empirical sciences. Maureen Condic has brought to my attention additional research
that suggests that only some of blastomeres manifest anything like totipotency (see her contribution
to this volume).
33. That reason, of course, it that it shares all of the same cells except one. If a particularly
energetic researcher were to separate a multi-celled blastocyst into each of it component blastomeres
and foster the development of each of them into a separate embryo, then we would be in a situation
similar to the worm case. Perhaps, in such a case, we would be particularly inclined to assume worm
possibility (2) is operative (i.e. that the original embryo was destroyed). As in the twin case,
however, it does not make much of a difference.
34. The thought is largely based on the idea that, metaphysically speaking, each totipotent
blastomere is like a zygote. So the blastocyst is like a collection of "zygotes" rather than a single
organism.
35. Hershenov & Koch-Hershenov, supra note 30, at 247.
36. Id. at 248.
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assimilating oxygen, maintaining its boundary, etc."" This empirical claim
is contested by other commentators such as A. A. Howsepian who asserts
"there is ample physiological evidence for the existence of dynamic chemical
interactions taking place between the blastomeres"" and that "a study of
blastomeric cleavage patterns appears strongly to indicate that the collection
of cells we have been calling the two-celled preembryo functions as a
biodynamic unit and thus is ... a continuing homeodynamic event which
constitutes a single life"39
There is obviously a serious disagreement here about how to read the
available empirical evidence, and perhaps further research will give us better
grounds for adjudicating it. However, because there are also disagreements
here about the philosophical question of what constitutes life, even further
empirical evidence may not be fully dispositive on the question.
In my view, the composite object hypothesis seems largely unfounded
regardless of whether further empirical evidence can be adduced concerning
intercellular interaction between the blastomeres. This is because there is a
stark disanalogy between the early embryo and the Hershenovs' cheerleader
pyramid analogue, namely that the blastomeres-and not the cheerleaders-
are teleologically ordered to the generation of a specific kind of thing. They
attempt to deny this by allowing
that the early embryo has a telos for when in the proper
circumstances it develops into an organism. The cells behave as if
that is their goal. But our cheerleaders too can have a goal of
constructing their pyramid in a certain way without that aim
transforming them into a giant organism. 40
Unfortunately, this is just a misunderstanding of what it means to say that
the early embryo has a telos. The mistake lies in conflating the cheerleaders'
"goal of constructing their pyramid" with the teleological ordering of the
embryo towards further development."1
The cheerleaders' goal is (presumably) the result of their practical
reasoning. Their goal is a psychological plan to bring about some state of
affairs in response to other psychological and/or moral considerations (e.g.
desires, promises, etc.). Obviously, the embryo has no such psychological
"goal." Unlike the cheerleaders, it makes no choices. Indeed, given the right
conditions, it cannot help but develop towards its proper telos. In contrast,
37. Id. at 247.
38. Howsepian, A. A., Who or What We Are?, REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS 45, no. 3 (1992):
483-502, 490.
39. Id. at 491.
40. Hershenov & Koch-Hershenov, supra note 30, at 248.
41. Id.
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constituting pyramidal human structures is in no way the telos of any of the
cheerleaders, though it might be something they want and decide to do. This
is because the relevant sense of telos is not a psychological end, but an
Aristotelian final causality belonging to an individual solely in virtue of his
or her nature.
Not only does the cheerleader pyramid analogy collapse on closer
inspection, the importance of this teleological ordering of the embryo cannot
be overstated. It is not an accident that early embryos develop in fetuses,
babies, children, and adults. The reason it is not an accident is precisely
because the telos of an early embryo is a reflection of its nature as a human
organism.
Aristotelian final causes have long been continually misunderstood and
misrepresented. At the heart of Aristotle's insistence on the primacy of final
causation over the sorts of causation typically thought definitive in modem
science (i.e. material and efficient), is the simple but deeply important point
that in the absence of final causality there is no explanation for the regularity
of nature. Forms of reductive materialism were familiar to Aristotle-e.g. the
atomism of Democritus-and in the Physics II he "shows that an opponent
who claims that material and efficient causes alone suffice to explain natural
change fails to account for their characteristic regularity."42
The key idea is that while efficient and material causation might be
adequate to explain some empirical phenomenon in a given case, alone they
are not adequate for explaining why certain phenomena regularly recur.
Aristotle's example in the Physics regards the regular shape of teeth (i.e. the
sharpness of the incisors and the flat grinding surfaces of the molars). While
material and efficient causation might explain why a given individual has
teeth shaped in such a way, those two causes are not adequate for explaining
why nearly all creatures of the same kind (whether horses or human beings)
have teeth shaped in more or less the same way. In fact, as Edward Feser
points out, ultimately "we cannot make sense of efficient causality without
final causality."43 As Feser goes on to note, the reason for this goes to the
heart of Humean skepticism about the capacity of induction to establish
universal laws of nature. The irony, of course, is that Humean skepticism just
unwittingly demonstrates Aristotle's exact point: without final causality there
is no real explanation of causal regularity in nature.
For our purposes in thinking about the embryo, the regularity with which
zygotes develop along a continuous path into infants is exactly what requires
explanation. It is not as if some human embryos develop into giraffes and
some into peanuts and some into infants. Rather, insofar as they develop
42. Andrea Falcon, Aristotle on Causality, THE STAN. ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHIL., available at
http://plato.stanford.edularchives/win201 2/entries/aristotle-causality/ (last revised Oct. 15, 2012).
43. FESER, supra note 18, at 18.
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properly, all human embryos develop into mature instances of the natural
kind human being. Of course, this is not to deny that many actual embryos
do not survive or properly develop for a variety of reasons. It is also not to
deny that some of the ones that do survive suffer various defects. But the key
point is that, conceptually as well as ontologically, those defective
individuals are defective precisely insofar as they fail to instantiate some
important aspect of human nature."
Of course, this is exactly where the finality of an individual natural kind
comes into play. Human embryos regularly develop into infants, and not into
giraffes, because they are teleologically ordered to do so in virtue of
possessing a human nature. Once we see this, we can recognize that
immanent causality, which we saw above as definitive of life, itself involves
an appeal to finality insofar as the immanent causal processes are ultimately
directed to the good of the individual to which they belong. Furthermore, that
individual's good is itself determined by its nature as an instance of a
particular natural kind.
We can now bring together a number of loose threads. By any remotely
plausible standard, the zygote is a single-celled living being, ontologically
unique, and the agent/subject of a variety of immanent causal processes.
Furthermore, from the beginning of its existence,45 many of those immanent
causal processes are fundamentally directed towards a continuous and
unbroken path of development towards the mature condition of its natural
kind (i.e. an adult). Precisely in virtue of this fundamental continuity, any
kind of successionist model involving substantial change-such as we saw
above with the historical view-is ruled out.
Obviously, in individual cases, development can be frustrated and there
is no guarantee that in any individual case a given zygote will result in a
viable fetus, infant, child, adult, etc. But we do know it will not result in a
giraffe or a peanut. The explanation for this is nothing other than the fact
that the zygote possesses a human nature. Accordingly, the zygote is, and can
be nothing else than, a human individual, fully possessed of the exact same
44. See THOMPSON, supra note 20, at 68 (explaining that it is important not to confuse a
"natural-historical judgment"-statement about the kind of regularity that arises out the nature of
some natural kind (his example is "Man sheds his teeth")-with a universally quantified statement
(For all X, if X is a man, X sheds its teeth), or even a claim about statistical likelihood (most human
beings shed their teeth). Rather such statements reflect something deeper about (in this case) the
form of life of a particular kind of living thing and the life-cycle characteristic of living creatures
possessing a particular nature. Whether or not any actual given human being (or even a majority of
human beings) actually shed their teeth is irrelevant to their truth of the statement "man sheds his
teeth" or (as an Aristotelian might say), "human beings by nature shed their teeth.").
45. There is, in fact, some controversy about when in the process of fertilization we can say
the zygote exists. See Maureen Condic, When Does Life Begin? A Scientific Perspective,
WESTCHESTER INST. FOR ETHICS & THE HUMAN PERS. (2008), http://bdfund.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/wi-whitepaper life print.pdf Ultimately, for the purposes of the moral
evaluation of abortion, it does not make much difference so long as it occurs relatively quickly.
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nature as any other human individual at whatever level of development.
Furthermore, as possessed of a human nature, all the essential properties
of that nature necessarily belong to it, including rationality. Of course, that
does not mean that the embryo manifests any of the actions that typically
characterize rationality, such as abstract thought or use of language, etc.
Rather, the embryo possesses its rationality in potency. But the key point is
that it has the potential to manifest rationality only because it is an instance
of the natural kind human being, to which rationality belongs as an essential
property. On this Aristotelian model, "for something to have some feature
potentially entails a kind of directedness to the actualization of that
potential."46 Again, the causal power of human nature is required precisely to
explain the regularity with which human embryos mature into rational agents.
THE NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT AND SOME PRO-ABORTION
OBJECTIONS
With all of this in mind, we can close with a brief application of this
metaphysical picture to the abortion question in particular. As I noted at the
start, I have intended this as a work of philosophical embryology, and not as
specifically addressed to the normative question of abortion. Nonetheless, the
moral implications of the metaphysical view developed here are clear.
First, if the wrongness of murder consists in the killing of an innocent
human being, then the killing of the embryo, from conception, is an instance
of murder. Indeed, even if we prefer to specify the wrongness of murder as
the unjustified killing of a philosophically defined person (as opposed to a
human being) the embryo still qualifies. For even if we cannot easily give an
account of exactly what properties are sufficient for a substance to count as
a moral person, if a normal adult human being counts as a person, then so
does the embryo.
This follows simply from the reasonable assumption that what makes a
normal adult human being a person is some aspect of his or her human nature.
Thus, anything that shares that nature would also have to count as a person.
The most natural suggestion is that personhood has something essentially to
do with rationality. Accordingly, any being that is rational by nature would
count as a person.
Of course, the standard claim of abortion advocates is that immature
human beings are "pre-rational" and hence do not count as persons and so
cannot be the victims of murder. By contrast, on the neo-Aristotelian model
developed here, no human being is ever "pre-rational." All human beings are
always already rational, though it is true that in particular cases their rational
46. FESER, supra note 18, at 18.
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powers might be in potency. 47 The key Aristotelian metaphysical grounds for
this is simply that no power can be in potency except insofar as it belongs to
the nature of the kind of thing that has that potential power. In other words,
all human beings, including the immature and incapacitated, as well as those
who are in some way "defective," are always already rational simply because
all human beings qua human beings instantiate a human nature that is
essentially rational. Furthermore, this is true even if those individuals will
never manifest the rational powers (e.g. an anencephalic infant).
In short, on this view the set of human beings is, at minimum, a complete
subset of the set of moral persons understood substances of a rational nature.
In principle at least, there might also be non-human moral persons, though
we have no natural knowledge of such, and it is ultimately irrelevant for
present purposes. Now it should be clear why many pro-abortion commenters
are wrong to claim that those advocating the pro-life position are constrained
to say that embryos (and, indeed, infants) are merely potentially rational.
This confusion is repeatedly demonstrated in the pro-abortion literature,
manifest in important commentators such as Michael Tooley and Daniel
Boonin. Tooley, for instance, has spent the last forty years trotting out the
same lame argument about the pro-life appeal to potentiality.48 For instance,
largely rehashing his famous kitten argument from 1972,49 he has recently
claimed that the pro-life argument is best understood as involving an appeal
to this principle: "1*. The extent to which an entity possesses a given right R
is related to the extent to which the things into which it may develop possess
right R, taking into account the relevant probabilities""o But, Tooley claims,
[I]f one considers the case of a kitten that will, if there is no
interference, be injected with a chemical that will transform its brain
so that it will have the capacities for thought and self-consciousness,
and hence, presumably, a serious right to life, it is clear that (1*) is
47. This is true not only of immature human beings, but also those that are sleeping, in comas,
or even incapacitated by injury or congenital defect.
48. See Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37, 37-65 (1972)
[hereinafter Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide]; MICHAEL TOOLEY ET AL., ABORTION: THREE
PERSPECTIVES (2009) [hereinafter TOOLEY ET AL.]. I suppose, to be fair, that it is conceivable that
there are pro-life commentators who offer the argument Tooley criticizes. However, it never seems
to occur to him that the pro-life appeal to potentiality can be understood in the Aristotelian way.
49. There, Tooley asks us to imagine that some special chemical that if injected "could initiate
a causal process that would transform a kitten into an entity that would eventually possess
properties" such as rationality. Such a kitten, he argues, would be a potential person, but would not
(prior to achieving rationality) have an actual right to life. Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, supra
note 48, at 60. Of course, on the neo-Aristotelian model this is not only a ridiculous example, even
if it were somehow possible it would just mean that the kitten had undergone a substantial change
into a substance of a rational nature, and therefore would have the same rights as any other instance
of that category of beings.
50. ToOLEY ET AL., supra note 48, at 41.
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false, since the kitten, before the injections does not have a serious
right to life."
The mistake, of course, is that on the neo-Aristotelian substance ontology
model, the pro-life argument for the moral value of the embryo (including its
"rights" if we wish to use that language52) does not depend on an appeal to
the moral value of "the things into which it may develop." On this model
the embryo has moral value for what it always already is, (in virtue of
instantiating a rational human nature), not because of what it might become
(in the future, "taking into account the relevant probabilities"). 54 In other
words, contrary to the expectations of the pro-abortion advocates, the pro-life
appeal on this model is not some form of the following defective argument:
(1) Embryos are potential persons.
(2) Persons have a right to life.
(3) Therefore, embryos have a right to life.
Rather, on this model, embryos are always already persons, because what
it means to be a person is simply to be a substance of a rational nature, and
any possessor of human nature qualifies. A particular creature either entirely
possesses a human nature or entirely lacks one. Thus, it is nonsensical to
speak of the embryo as a "potential person." In short, the pro-life position is
best captured in an alternative premise that embryos are always already
persons (in virtue of possessing a human nature). From which, assuming that
persons have a right to life, the pro-life conclusion clearly follows.
Daniel Boonin demonstrates a similar confusion when he writes:
One could, I suppose, characterize [an anencephalic] fetus as a
person whose capacity for thought simply happens to be "blocked"
by a continent fact about its head. But then it is difficult to see why
we should not also call the spider crawling up my window a person.
If he were able to develop a big enough brain, he too would be able
to function as a person, so he is simply a person whose capacity is
blocked by the fact that he will never have a large enough brain . ..
51. Id.
52. For reasons relating to the fundamental ambiguity of their metaphysical grounding I am
wary of speaking of "rights," but since that is a common mode of expression in these contexts I am
willing to make my points in those terms for the sake of convenience. Ultimately, wherever I advert
to the "rights" of embryos, etc, I should be read as asserting a conditional; something on the order
of: if anything (e.g. a normal adult human being) has a "right to life," then so do embryos.
53. TOOLEY ET AL., supra note 48, at 41.
54. Id.
55. DAVID BOONIN, A DEFENSE OF ABORTION 24 (2003).
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But, of course, this is nonsense. It is proper to say that the anencephalic
fetus' "capacity for thought" is "blocked" because, owing to a birth defect,
that fetus is contingently incapable of realizing one of the potencies that
essentially belongs to it as an instance a human nature.56 This is parallel to
the case of an infant born without legs. That legless child is still properly
called a bipedal creature simply because it is a human being, all of whom are
bipedal by nature-even those that will never actually walk. Boonin just fails
to understand what it means to say that "human beings are rational by nature,"
which is related to a Thompson-style "natural-historical judgment" that
cannot be falsified by the failure of any given human being to manifest
rationality."
Obviously, it is not proper to say that the spider's "capacity for thought"
is "blocked" by anything, because arachnid nature does not, in any respect,
include the rational powers. There is no sense in which the spider's
development is blocked, precisely because that implies an orientation towards
rationality that it simply does not have. And, of course, we know this simply
because human infants regularly do mature into children who manifest the
rational powers, while spiders never do.
Neither does this involve a fallacious attempt to derive an "actual right
to life" from a "potential right to life." On the neo-Aristotelian model, the
embryo does not have a "potential right to life;" it has exactly as much of a
right to life as any other human individual. If one assumes that all persons
have a "right to life," the embryo, as an instance of rational human nature,
has such a right.
Of course, all of this is a consequence of conceiving of a human being as
a substance of a rational nature. On the neo-Aristotelian model, nothing can
come to manifest the rational powers (and remain the same substance) unless
rationality already belongs to it by nature. Tooley, Boonin, and others fail to
even countenance this possibility. Perhaps needless to say, if they did take
the time to understand the model, they would likely reject it and the
Aristotelian metaphysical principles on which it depends. However, as I have
attempted to show above, without something like this analysis, especially
including an appeal to the teleological ordering of nature in general, and
human nature in particular, we find ourselves unable to explain even very
simple facts, such as that human embryos regularly mature into individuals
who manifest rational activity, while kittens and spiders never do.
56. Id.
57. See THOMPSON, supra note 20. Strictly speaking, the relevant natural-historical judgment
would be something like "human beings think abstractly" or "human beings use language."
